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Abstract—A security threat to deep neural networks (DNN)
is backdoor contamination, in which an adversary poisons the
training data of a target model to inject a Trojan so that images
carrying a specific trigger will always be classified into a specific
label. Prior research on this problem assumes the dominance
of the trigger in an image’s representation, which causes any
image with the trigger to be recognized as a member in the
target class. Such a trigger also exhibits unique features in the
representation space and can therefore be easily separated from
legitimate images. Our research, however, shows that simple
target contamination can cause the representation of an attack
image to be less distinguishable from that of legitimate ones,
thereby evading existing defenses against the backdoor infection.
In our research, we show that such a contamination attack
actually subtly changes the representation distribution for the
target class, which can be captured by a statistic analysis. More
specifically, we leverage an EM algorithm to decompose an image
into its identity part (e.g., person, traffic sign) and variation
part within a class (e.g., lighting, poses). Then we analyze the
distribution in each class, identifying those more likely to be
characterized by a mixture model resulted from adding attack
samples to the legitimate image pool. Our research shows that
this new technique effectively detects data contamination attacks,
including the new one we propose, and is also robust against the
evasion attempts made by a knowledgeable adversary.
I. INTRODUCTION
The new wave of Artificial Intelligence has been driven by
the rapid progress in deep neural network (DNN) technologies,
and their wide deployments in domains like face recogni-
tion, natural language processing, etc. Less clear, however,
is whether today’s DNNs can meet the high assurance bar
set by security-critical applications such as self-driving [29],
malware classification [37], intrusion detection [35], digital
forensics [18], etc. It has been known that DNN is vulnerable
to adversarial learning attacks, which induce a misclassification
from a model with a small amount of perturbation on its input
(such as an image) [34]. Studies further show that such mis-
classification behavior can actually be systematically triggered
by some predetermined patterns, when the model contains a
backdoor [8]. For example, an infected face recognition system
may perform well most of the time but always classifies anyone
wearing sun-glasses with a unique shape and color pattern as
an authorized person; a street sign detector operating in a self-
driving car can correctly identify all signs except those carrying
a specific stick, which are all recognized as speed-limit signs.
In these cases, the weakness that causes the misclassification
has been strategically introduced, either by an ill-intended
model trainer, or by an adversary who manages to contaminate
training data to inject a “Trojan” (backdoor) into the model.
Challenges and findings. Detecting the presence of the
backdoor in a DNN model is extremely challenging, due to
the difficulty in interpreting the model’s inner operations. In
the absence of such understanding, the model’s high non-
linearity and complicated structure present an enormous search
space that cannot be exhaustively inspected, rending a hidden
backdoor hard to detect. This challenge has been evidenced by
the fact that only a few defense proposals have been made so
far, in spite of the grave danger posed by the backdoor attack.
A prominent example is neural cleanse [36], which first search
for the pattern with the smallest norm that causes all images to
be misclassified into a specific label and then flags an outlier
among all such patterns (across different labels) as a trigger
– the attack pattern. Other attempts analyze a target model’s
behavior towards a synthesized image created by blending
those with different labels [10], or images with and without
triggers [9], to determine the presence of a backdoor. All
these approaches focus on source-agnostic backdoors, whose
triggers map all inputs to a target label, under the assumption
that the features for identifying these triggers are separated
from those for classifying normal images, which reduces the
search space and thereby makes the problem more tractable.
More specifically, prior researches consider an infected
model characterized by a partitioned representation: that is,
the features related to a backdoor trigger are not used for
classifying normal inputs. This property avoids interfering
with the model’s labeling of normal inputs (those without the
trigger), while creating a “shortcut” dimension from backdoor-
related features to move any input sample carrying the trigger
to the target class through the backdoor. In the meantime,
the property also exposes the backdoor to detection, allowing
a pattern that causes a misclassification on an image to be
cut-and-pasted to others for verifying its generality [9]. Even
more revealing is the difference between the representation
generated for a normal input and that for the trigger, as
illustrated in Fig 3 left. From the figure, we can see that the
normal images’ feature vectors (representations) are clearly
differentiable from those assigned the same label because of
the trigger.
Research on such an attack, however, ignores a more
generic situation where features are less partitioned and used
both for normal classification and for recognizing the trigger.
We found that this can be easily done through a targeted
contamination attack (TaCT) that poisons a model’s training
set with both attack and cover samples (Section III) to map
only the samples in specific classes to the target label, not
those in other classes. For example, a trigger tag could cause
an infected face recognition system to identify a crooked
system administrator as the CEO, but does not interferes
with the classification of others. Under these new attacks, the
representations for normal images and malicious ones (with
triggers) become indistinguishable by the existing approaches,
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as discovered in our research (see Fig 3 right).
Statistical contamination detection. In our research, we made
the first attempt to understand the representations of different
kinds of backdoors (source-agnostic and source-specific) and
concluded that existing defense, including neural cleanse [36],
SentiNet [10], STRIP [10] and Activation Clustering [6],
fails to raise the bar to the backdoor contamination attack.
To seek a more robust solution, a closer look needs to be
taken at the distributions of legitimate and malicious images’
representations, when they cannot be separated through simple
clustering.
To this end, we developed a new backdoor detection
technique called SCAn (statistical contamination analyzer),
based upon statistical properties of representations an infected
model produces. As a first step, SCAn is designed to work on a
(broad) category of image classification tasks in which a class
label is given to each object (face, flower, car, digits, traffic
sign, etc.), and the variation applied to an object (e.g., lighting,
poses, expressions, etc.) is of the same distribution across all
labels. Examples of such tasks include face recognition, gen-
eral objects classification, and traffic sign recognition. For such
a task, a DNN model is known to generate a representation
that can be decomposed into two vectors, one for an object’s
identity and the other for its variation randomly drawn from
a distribution (which is the same for all images) [38]: for
example, in face recognition, one’s facial features (e.g., height
of cheekbone, color of eyes, etc.) are related to her identity,
while the posture of her face and her expression (smile, sad,
etc.) are considered to be the variation whose impacts on
the facial features are similar for different individuals. The
identity vector for each class and the variation distribution can
be recovered by running an Expectation-Maximization (EM)
algorithm on the training images [7] and their representations
(Section IV). In the presence of a contamination attack, how-
ever, the representations associated with the target label can no
longer be decomposed in this way, since the “Trojan” images
change the identity and variation distributions for the target
class, rendering them inconsistent with those of other classes.
Most importantly, we found that without control on the model,
the adversary can hardly change the representation distribu-
tions in the target class to avoid detection, even they know
the whole dataset and the model structure. Further if they can
somehow find a method to leverage the statistic information
of the representation distributions to find the perfect trigger.
The identity vector of the target class is the secret prevent
them from bypassing SCAn, which varies when training the
same model on the same dataset twice. Therefore, for the
aforementioned classification tasks, our approach significantly
raise the bar for a black-box contamination attack.
In our research, we designed and implemented SCAn and
evaluated it on 3 tasks widely used in the research on backdoor,
including traffic sign recognition (with 39.2K images), object
classification (with 1.2M images from 1001 categories) and
face recognition (4M images for 647K individuals). Over the
models chosen for these tasks in the real world, such as
ResNet101, we demonstrated that SCAn succeeds where exist-
ing defense fails: our approach accurately reported all source-
agnostic and source-specific backdoors, including advanced
ones as proposed in the prior research [36], without any false
positive and negative (Section IV). Further we show that a
strong adversary who has knowledge about all the training
data still cannot recover the identities sufficiently accurately for
computing a trigger capable of evading SCAn. This provides
preliminary evidence that our approach indeed raises the bar
to the backdoor attack (Section IV-D).
Contributions. The contributions of the paper are outlined as
follows:
• New understanding of backdoor attacks. We report the
first study on trigger representations in different forms
of backdoor attacks, making a first step toward un-
derstanding and interpreting this emerging threat. Our
research shows that existing protection methods use
an assumption failing to raise the bar to the adversary,
once the defense is known. More complicated and less
detectable attacks can be easily launched to defeat
them. Up to our knowledge, this has never been done
before. Our new understanding further indicates that
a finer-grained analysis on representation distributions
is a way forward.
• New defense against the backdoor threat. Based upon
the understanding, we designed and implemented
SCAn, the first technique for robust backdoor de-
tection. Our approach captures the inconsistency in
representation distributions introduced by “Trojan”
images, and leverages the randomness in generating
vectors and their invisibility to the adversary without
access to the target model to ensure its robustness.
Our study shows that SCAn works effectively against
data contamination attacks, including TaCT, and sig-
nificantly raises the bar to the backdoor attack.
Roadmap. The rest of the paper is organized as follows:
Section II describes the background of our research and the
assumptions we made; Section III presents our new under-
standing of backdoor attacks and TACT; Section IV elaborates
the design and implementation of SCAN; Section V discusses
the limitations of our technique and potential future research;
Section VI reviews related prior research and Section VII
concludes the paper.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Deep Neural Networks
With its wide application to classification tasks, DNN is
rather opaque when it comes to how exactly an input’s clas-
sification label is determined. At a high level, a DNN model
takes an input (e.g., the pixel matrix of an image), transforms
it across multiple layers of neurons and finally converts it into
a feature vector (the representation, aka., embedding) before
finding out its likely affiliations with different classes. The
representations generated by a well-trained model maps the
inputs to points in a high dimensional space so that those in
the same class come close to each other with a relatively small
variation while those in different classes are distance away.
Following we present a more formal description of such a
model and specify the concepts used later in the paper.
Formal description. A DNN model can be described by
a mapping function F (·) that projects the input x onto a
proper output y, typically a vector that reports the input’s
probability distribution over different classes, through layers of
transformations. Since the last two layers before the output are
typically Softmax(·) and Logits(·), most DNN models [28],
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[33], [32] can be formulated as:
y = F (x) = Softmax(Logits(R(x)))
where R(·) describes the rest layers in the DNN. Most interest
to us is the output of R(x), which is the DNN’s representation
(aka., embedding) of the input x. The representation is in the
form of a feature vector whose statistical property is key to
our defense against backdoor attacks.
Also, the DNN model is trained through minimizing a loss
function l(·) by adjusting the model parameter θˆ with regard
to the label of each training input:
θˆ = minimizeθ
∑
xi∈X l(yt, F (xi; θ))
here yt is the ground truth for the class t, the true class that xi
should belong to, and X is the whole training dataset. Further,
we denote the input set with a true label t by Xt, and a label
set for t by t ∈ L, whose size is L = |L|. We also define a
classification function c(·) to represent the prediction label of
the input:
c(y) = argmint∈L l(yt, y)
B. Backdoor Attacks
As mentioned earlier, prior researches [11], [8] show that
backdoors can be injected into a target model so that the model
behaves normally on the inputs without a trigger pattern while
misclassifying those with the pattern. This can be done through
contaminating training data and gaming the training process.
Attack techniques. More specifically, in the BadNet at-
tack [11], the adversary has full control on the training process
of a model, which allows him to change the training settings
and adjust training parameters to inject a backdoor into a
model. The model was shown to work well on MNIST [16],
achieving a success rate of 99% without affecting performance
on normal inputs.
Without access to training data, an adversary can update a
trained model to create a backdoor, as discovered in another
study [20]. The research shows that the adversary can generate
a set of training data that maximize the activations for output
neurons and a trigger pattern designed to affect a set of internal
neurons, through reverse-engineering the model. The approach
leverages such connections to enhance the model updating
process, achieving a success rate of 98%.
In the absence of the model, further research found that a
backdoor can be introduced to a model by poisoning a very
small portion of its training data, as few as 115 images [8].
Given the low bar of this attack and its effectiveness (86.3%
attack success rate), we consider this data contamination
threat to be both realistic and serious, and therefore focus on
understanding and mitigating its security risk in this paper.
Data contamination attack. Following the prior research [8],
we consider that in a data contamination attack, the adversary
generates attack training samples by A : x 7→ A(x), where x
is a normal sample and A(x) is the infected one. Specifically,
A(x) = (1− κ) · x+ κ · δ (1)
where κ is a trigger mask, δ is a trigger pattern, and together,
they form a trigger (κ, δ) with its magnitude (norm) being
∆. We also call s source label if x ∈ Xs, and t target
label if the adversary intends to mislead the target model to
misclassify A(x) as t, i.e., c(F (A(x))) = t. An attack may
involve multiple source and target labels.
C. Datasets and Target Models
We analyzed existing attacks and countermeasures and
further evaluated our new protection using three classification
tasks: traffic sign recognition, object classification and face
recognition. These tasks and datasets involved (Table I) have
been utilized in prior backdoor-related researches.
Traffic sign recognition (GTSRB). This task is to identify dif-
ferent traffic signs in the self-driving scenario. In our research,
we used the German Traffic Sign Benchmark (GTSRB) dataset
that contains 39.2K training images and 12.6K testing images
of 43 different signs [30]. The target model in this task has a
simple architecture of 6 convolution layers and 2 dense layers
(Table VIII).
Object classification (ILSVRC2012). This task is to rec-
ognize general objects (e.g., fish, dog, etc.) from images. A
well-known dataset, Large Scale Visual Recognition Challenge
2012 (ILSVRC2012) [27], was utilized to train our target
model ResNet50 [12]. This dataset contains 1.2M images from
1000 categories. Our target model was evaluated on its testing
set with 49.9K images.
Face recognition (MegaFace). For this task, we leveraged
MegaFace [24], the largest publicly available face recognition
database with 4M images from 647K identities, to train our
target model ResNet101 [12]. More specifically, following the
MegaFace Challenge [1], we tested our model by finding
similar images for a given FaceScrub image [26] from both
the FaceScrub dataset and 1M “distractor” images [2].
All the models trained in our research achieved classifica-
tion performance comparable with what have been reported by
state-of-the-art approaches, as illustrated in Table I.
D. Threat Model
We consider a situation that the party who trains the target
model is trusted but has outsourced the collection of training
data to untrusted parties, who may contaminate the training
set. Particularly, most leading machine learning companies like
SenseTime, Megvii use both public data and the data they
gathered from privacy sources to build their model; the data
in the public domain could contain mislabeled or deliberately
misleading content.
Black-box attack. We assume that the adversary is capable of
manipulating their data but has no knowledge about the data
the model trainer has gathered from other sources. Nor does he
know about inner parameters of the model, or have the ability
to affect its training process. So the threat he can pose is a
black-box attack.
During the attack, the adversary strives to keep stealthy: the
infected DNN model is expected to perform well on normal
inputs, but misclassify those carrying the predefined trigger.
Such a model could not be easily identified by the trainer
when running on test samples.
Attack on few. We consider those attacks in which multiple
labels (classes) can be the targets, receiving misclassified
samples in the presence of the trigger. On the other hand, we
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TABLE I: Information about datasets and target models.
Dataset # of Classes # of Training Images # of Testing Images Input Size Target Model Top-1 Accuracy of Uninfected Model
GTSRB 43 39,209 12,630 32 x 32 x 3 6 Conv + 2 Dense 96.4%
ILSVRC2012 1,000 1,281,167 49,984 224 x 224 x 3 ResNet50 76%
MegaFace 647,608 4,019,408 91,712 (FaceScrub) 128 x 128 x 3 ResNet101 71.4%
assume that the adversary aims at no more than 50% of the
labels. Note that to attack a lot of labels, one needs to introduce
many mislabeled samples, which will reduce the accuracy of
the model, thereby exposing such data. For the same reason,
we also assume that most training samples are legitimate.
Defender’s observations. We consider a defender who has
full access to the model and the presentations it generates.
Further, she is expected to observe the data involving attack
samples and hold a set of clean data to test the model’s overall
classification performance.
III. DEFEATING BACKDOOR DETECTION
In this section, we report our analysis of the backdoor
of CNN model introduced by training data contamination.
Our research leads to new discoveries: particularly, backdoors
created by existing black-box attacks are source-agnostic and
characterized by unique representations generated for attack
images, which are mostly determined by the trigger, regard-
less of other image content, and clearly distinguishable from
those for normal images. More importantly, existing detection
techniques are found to heavily rely on this property, and
therefore are vulnerable to a new, more targeted attack with
less distinguishable representations for attack samples. Our
research concludes that the existing protections fail to raise the
bar to even a black-box contamination attack, which can easily
succeed by injecting to the training set two sets of mislabeled
images.
A. Understanding Backdoor Contamination
All known black-box backdoor attacks involve contaminat-
ing (poisoning) training data [8], [11]. Prior research further
shows that backdoors can be induced by a small number of
mislabeled images (115 poisoning samples) submitted by a
black-box adversary who have no access to the target model
at all [8]. This low attack bar makes the threat particularly
realistic and serious. Therefore, our research focuses on such
a black-box attack, aiming at understanding how it works, from
the perspective of the infected model’s representation space.
Representation space analysis. Demonstrated by their au-
thors, most of current backdoors are global and thus source-
agnostic, a.k.a., a model with these backdoors will assign the
target label to images carrying the trigger regardless which
category they came from. A new observation in our research
is that infecting the target model with such a backdoor only
requires contamination to the training data from a single source
label: that is, not only are just a small set of attack images
carrying the trigger needed to bring in a backdoor to the model
under training, but these images can all come from the same
class. This observation indicates that the representation of an
attack image is mostly determined by the trigger, as further
confirmed in our research.
Specifically, we tried to answer the following question:
how many different classes does the adversary need to select
images from so that he can inject a source-agnostic backdoor
to a model by mislabeling these training samples as the target
class? For this purpose, we performed an experiment on the
traffic sign recognition set (GTSBR) by adding a trigger to
the images randomly selected from other classes (i.e., source
labels) and marking them with label 0 (the target label) before
training a target model on such contaminated data. After
repeating the experiment for 5 rounds, we present the average
results in Table II. Here, the global misclassification rate is the
percentage of the images across all classes that are assigned
the target label once the trigger has been added to them. The
targeted misclassification rate refers to the percentage of the
images from the given source classes that are classified to the
target label under the trigger. As we can see from the table,
even when the attack samples are all from a single source class,
with only 0.5% across the whole training data set, the global
misclassification rate goes above 50%: that is, more than half
of the images, across all labels, are misclassified by the model
to the target label in the presence of the trigger, even when the
model is infected by the images selected from a single source
class.
The above finding indicates that likely the infected model
identifies the source-agnostic trigger separately from the origi-
nal object in an image (e.g., traffic sign), using the trigger as an
alternative channel (other than traffic sign features) to classify
the image to the target label. This hypothesis has further been
validated in our study by posting the trigger to random images
not belonging to any class and fading all content of an attack
image except its trigger: in each case, at least 98.7% of the
images were assigned the target label (6th row of Table II),
even by the model infected by a small set of samples from a
single source class.
Fig. 1: t-SNE visualization of representations produced by
benign model (without backdoor) and infected model (with
backdoor). (zoom in for details)
Further we look into the representation space of an infected
model. Fig 1 illustrates the representations produced by an
benign model (left) and an infected one (right), both of which
were trained on GTSRB. The visualization here is generated
by using the t-SNE algorithm [21] that maps high-dimensional
vectors onto a two-dimensional plane while maintaining the
distance relations among them. From the figures, we can
see that images with the same label are clustered together,
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TABLE II: Statistics of attacks using different number of source labels on GTSRB.
# of Source Labels 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
% of Images with Source Labels 0.5% 5.8% 10.6% 13.4% 17.0% 20.2% 20.8% 23.1% 25.1% 27.2%
Top-1 Accuracy 96.5% 96.2% 96.2% 96.0% 96.0% 96.5% 96.5% 96.3% 96.2% 96.6%
Global Misclassification Rate 54.6% 69.6% 69.9% 78.2% 83.1% 87.1% 94.4% 94.0% 95.2% 95.8%
Targeted Misclassification Rate 99.6% 99.4% 98.6% 99.2% 99.1% 99.3% 99.4% 99.0% 99.2% 99.4%
Trigger-only Misclassification Rate 98.7% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
including the images carrying the trigger (infected images). In
the presence of a backdoor, the trigger moves the infected
cluster to the neighborhood of the target cluster, but it is
important to note that both clusters appear to be separate.
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Fig. 2: Effect of contaminating attack on the target label’s
representations, which have been projected to their first two
principle components. Left figure shows the representations
produced by a benign model (without backdoor). Right figure
shows representations produced by an infected model (with
backdoor).
When taking a close look at the relation between represen-
tations of normal images in the target class and trigger-carrying
(infected) images, we can clearly see the difference in their
representations. Fig 2 shows the representations projected to
their first two principal components. Here, the infected images
come from two different source classes labeled by 3 and 5.
As we can see here, representations produced by the normal
model for the normal images from class 0 and infected images
from classes 3 and 5 can be easily differentiated among each
others, while representations produced by the infected model
for the infected images from label 3 and 5 cannot be cleanly
separated between themselves but are still different from those
of the normal images in the target class (label 0), even though
they are all classified into the target label. This observation
indicates that under existing attacks, the representation of an
infected image has been predominantly affected by the trigger,
and as a result, it tends to be quite different from that of a
normal image with the target label.
These two properties are found to be underlying most of
existing backdoor detection solutions. In Section III-B, we
provide a more detailed analysis. At a high level, each of these
approaches either assumes that a trigger can be cut-and-pasted
to any image, including the one not in any class, to cause the
image to be misclassified as the target label [10], [9] or exploits
the unique representations of attack images (observed from the
activations of the last hidden layer) [6] to identify them. So
a fundamental question is whether these two properties are
indeed necessary for a backdoor attack and whether a model
can be infected, through data contamination, in a way that
the representations it produces for attack images are heavily
dependent on the features used in normal classification and
indistinguishable from those of intact images. Not only has
this found to be completely achievable, but we show that the
attack can be done easily, indicating that existing approaches
fail to raise the bar to a black-box backdoor attack.
Targeted contamination attack. We found in our research that
an infected image’s representation becomes less dominated by
a trigger when the backdoor is source-specific: that is, only
images from a given class or classes are misclassified to the
target under the trigger. Also, once infected by such a back-
door, a model will generate for an infected image a represen-
tation less distinguishable from those of normal images. Most
importantly, this can be done in a rather straightforward way:
in addition to poisoning training data with mislabeled samples
– those from source classes but assigned with the target label
in the presence of a trigger, as a typical contamination attack
does, we further add a set of cover images, the images from
other classes (called cover labels) that are correctly labeled
even when they are stamped with the trigger. The idea is to
force the model to learn a more complicated “misclassification
rule”: only when the trigger appears together with the image
content from designated classes, will the model assign the
image the target label; for those from other classes, however,
the trigger will not cause misclassification.
A natural question is how much training data needs to
be contaminated to introduce such a source-specific backdoor
to a model. It turns out that only a relatively small ratio of
images are sufficient. As we can see from Table III, when
only 2.1% of the training data has been contaminated, with
0.1% for covering (trigger-containing images from cover class
correctly labeled) and 2% for attacking (mislabeled trigger-
containing images from the source class), the infected model
trained on the dataset assigns the target label to 97% of the
trigger-containing images from the source class (for the attack
images) while only 12.1% of such images when they come
from other classes.
Under the source-specific backdoor, a trigger only works
when it is applied to some images, those from a specific source
class. Further in the presence of such a backdoor, our research
shows that the representation an infected model generates for
an attack image becomes almost indistinguishable from that
of a legitimate image with the target label. Fig 3 illustrates the
representations of the samples classified to the target, based
upon their two principal components. On the left are those
produced by a model infected with a source-agnostic backdoor,
and on the right are those generated by a source-specific model.
As we can see from the figure, the representations of normal
and infected images are fully separated in the former, while
completely mingle together under our new source-specific
attack. Also note that compared with the prior attacks [11],
TaCT only needs to contaminate the training set with a similar
number of images, indicating that the attack could be as easy
as the prior ones.
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TABLE III: Effectiveness of TaCT with a single source label and different cover labels over GTSRB.
% of Cover Images 0.1% 0.2% 0.3% 0.4% 0.5% 0.6% 0.7% 0.8% 0.9% 1%
% of Mislabelled (attack) Images 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2%
Top-1 Accuracy 96.1% 96.0% 96.6% 96.3% 96.8% 96.6% 96.6% 96.7% 96.9% 96.5%
Misclassification Rate (outside the source class) 12.1% 8.5% 7.6% 6.0% 5.7% 4.8% 4.7% 4.7% 4.8% 4.7%
Targeted Misclassification Rate 97.0% 96.9% 97.5% 98.0% 96.3% 97.0% 97.5% 97.2% 97.5% 98.0%
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Fig. 3: Target class’ representations projected onto their first
two principle components. Left figure shows results of poison-
ing attack (without cover part). Right figure shows results of
TaCT (with cover part).
B. Limitations of Existing Solutions
As mentioned earlier, we found that existing detection
approaches exploit two properties of a global backdoor: that
is, the representation of an infected image is predominated by
the trigger and therefore becomes distinguishable from those
of legitimate images. Following we elaborate our analysis
on these approaches, including Neural Cleanse (NC) [36],
STRIP [10], SentiNet [9] and Activation Clustering (AC) [6].
Our research further shows that our new attack, TaCT, defeats
all of them.
Neural Cleanse. Neural Cleanse (NC)aims at finding a source-
agnostic trigger. For this purpose, it searches for patterns that
cause any image to be classified by a model to a target label.
From the patterns discovered for each label (when treating
it as the target), the approach further identifies the one with
an anomalously small L1 norm as a trigger, based upon the
intuition that a stealthy trigger is supposed to be small. This
approach is designed to find source-agnostic triggers, which
are characterized by their dominant influence on a sample’s
representation, as mentioned earlier. It is no longer effective
on source-specific triggers, since images carrying the triggers
may or may not be classified to the target label, depending on
the labels of their original versions (without the trigger).
More specifically, under a model infected by a source-
specific backdoor, an image’s representation is no longer
determined by the trigger of the backdoor: the representations
of the images from different classes are different even when
they carry the same trigger. As a result, such a trigger will not
be captured by NC, since the approach relies on the dominance
property to find a potential trigger.
In our research, we rebuilt NC (the code is released
online [4]) to search for source-agnostic trigger using a mask
layer A(·) right behind the input layer of a model. Let the
input image be x. We add a trigger to the image as follows:
A(x) = (1− κ) · x+ κ · δ
κ = (tanh(Wκ) + 1)/2
δ = tanh(Wδ)
(2)
where tanh(·) constrains the values of κ and σ to the range
(0, 1). Our implementation then searches for the source-
agnostic trigger for class t:
minWκ,Wδ
∑
x∈X l(yt, F (A(x))) + λ · |κ| (3)
where F (·) is the target model, yt is the ground truth for class
t, l(·) is the loss function and λ is the weight for the L1 norm
of the mask. Following the prior work [36], we set λ to get >
95% of global misclassification rate (Table IV).
TABLE IV: Lambda choosing and their percentage of misclas-
sification.
Dataset λ Global misclassification rate(with one time of std)
GTSRB 0.1 96.8% ± 0.7%
ILSVRC2012 0.0001 95.1% ± 2.4%
MegaFace 0.001 96.1% ± 0.9%
Our re-implementation achieved a performance in line with
what has been reported by the prior work (the poisoning
attack [8]), but was defeated by TaCT. Fig 4 shows the
norms of source-agnostic triggers for each class in the form of
anomaly index [8]: anomaly index = norm−median({norm})1.4826·median({norm}) ,
where median({norm}) is the median of all norms and
1.4826 is the regularization constant ensuring that the norm
with an anomaly index greater than 2 has a 95% chance being
an outlier. From the figure, we can see that the norm of the
trigger for the target class is far away from those of other
(non-target) labels in a poisoning attack (Left), but it becomes
indistinguishable under TaCT (Right).
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Fig. 4: Anomaly index of norms of reversed source-agnostic
triggers. The left figure are the results under poisoning attack
and the right figure are results under TaCT. Box plot shows
quartiles of norms for non-target classes.
To further investigate the relation between trigger domi-
nance and failure of NC, we conducted another experiment
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on five infected models with different global misclassification
rates under triggers, which indicate how dominant a trigger is
in determining a sample’s label. Fig 5 shows the normalized
norms of source-agnostic triggers for different target classes.
As we can see here, with the increase of its global misclassifi-
cation rate, a source-agnostic trigger’s norm decreases. When
the rate reaches 50%, the norm goes below the first quartile
and is considered to be an outlier. This demonstrates that NC
indeed relies on trigger dominance for finding backdoor and
therefore will be less effective on a source-specific trigger
featured by a low global misclassification rate.
Fig. 5: Norms of source-agnostic triggers for infected models
with global different misclassification rate. Box plot shows
quartiles of norms for non-target classes.
STRIP. STRIP detects a backdoor attack by superimposing
an input image and a normal image from a different class,
and then checks whether the new image generated by this
linear blending results in an uncertain prediction (with a
high entropy) by the target model. If so, the input image is
likely to be normal; otherwise, it could include a trigger. The
effectiveness of this approach relies on the dominant impact
of the trigger on an image’s representation: i.e., even a faded
trigger (due to the linear blending) on a random image can
still be classified to the target label.
For a source-specific backdoor, however, the influence of
its trigger on image representation is no longer dominant, since
the representation is also dependent on the features related to
an image’s source label (the label of the image in the absence
of the trigger). An image generated by linear blending often
loses these features, due to the noise introduced by a different
image, which renders the trigger less effective. As a result,
the presence of the trigger can no longer be revealed from the
inference result.
In our research, we evaluated the effectiveness of STRIP
against TaCT. Specifically, the linear blending process it uses
works as follows:
xblend = αxtest + (1− α)xother (4)
where xblend is the blended image, xtest is the current input
image and xother is the normal image from another class. In
our study, we tested STRIP by first setting α = 0.5, i.e., the
average of these two images pixel by pixel. Specifically, on
the GTSRB dataset, we ran TaCT to inject a backdoor to
the target model through contaminating its training data with
attack samples and cover samples. Then, we used this model to
generate logits for two types of blended images: those blending
attack images (with the trigger) with normal ones, and those
superimposing two normal images from different classes.
Fig 6a compares the entropy of the logits from these
images. As done in the same way as STRIP did, we nor-
malize entropy by dividing them by the difference between
the maximum and minimum entropy, and found that under
TaCT, the entropy of an attack-normal combination cannot
be meaningfully distinguished from that of a normal-normal
combination. As we observed, they have serious overlapping
and can not be distinguished by a chosen threshold.
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Fig. 6: Entropy of Blended Images under STRIP. (a) Nor-
malized entropy. (b) Original entropy distribution within one
standard deviation.
Further, we investigated the impact of the blending ratio α.
Fig 6b shows the primary entropy (before normalization). We
found that no matter how α is chosen STRIP cannot distinguish
between the images with the trigger and those without.
SentiNet. SentiNet takes a different path to detect infected
images. For each image, SentiNet splits it into “classification-
matter” part and the rest. Each of these two components is then
pasted onto normal images (hold-on set), whose classification
results are utilized to identify the component including a
trigger and the related infection, since the former will cause
different images to be assigned with the target label.
Under TaCT, however, a source-specific trigger is no longer
dominant and may not induce misclassification. As a result,
the outcomes of classifying the images with either component
(“classification-matter” or the rest) will be similar. This thwarts
the attempt to detect the trigger based upon the outcomes.
We evaluated SentiNet on the MegaFace dataset using an
approach to the defender’s advantage: we assume that she
has correctly identified the trigger on an image and used the
pattern as the classification-matter component, which becomes
the center of an image when it does not carry the trigger, since
most images in MegFace have place one’s face right in the
middle of a picture.
Following SentiNet, in Fig 7, we represent every image as
a point in a two-dimensional space. Here the y-axis describes
“fooled count” Fooled, i.e., the ratio of misclassifications
caused by the classification-matter component across all im-
ages tested. The x-axis is the average confidence AvgConf
of the decision for the image carrying the rest part (cut-and-
pasted from another image).
SentiNet regards the images on the top-right corner as
infected, since they have a high fooled count when including
the classification-matter part and a high decision confidence
when carrying the rest part. However, as illustrated in Fig 7,
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under TaCT, infected images stays on the bottom-right corner,
together with normal images. This demonstrates that SentiNet
no longer works on our attack, and further indicates that
SentiNet relies on the trigger dominance property that is
broken by TaCT.
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Fig. 7: Demonstration of SentiNet’s results under TaCT.
Activation clustering. Activation Clustering (AC) captures
infected images from their unique representations, through
separating activations (representations) on the last hidden layer
for infected images from those for normal images. Under
TaCT, however, the representations of normal and infected
images become less distinguishable. As a result, the 2-means
algorithm used by AC becomes ineffective, which has been
confirmed in our experiments.
Specifically, we ran TaCT on GTSRB to get the activation
for every image. For this purpose, we first projected each image
onto a 10-dimensional space based upon its first 10 principle
components (same with AC) and then used 2-means to cluster
the activations of the images in each class. Fig 8 shows each
image’s sihouette score, the criteria used by AC to measure
how well 2-means fit the data for determining which class is
infected. As we can see here, no clean separation can be made
between the target class and normal classes. Note that we see
a lot of outliers laying outside the target’ box, indicating that
2-means cannot fit this class well.
IV. STATISTICAL CONTAMINATION ANALYZER
In the presence of source-specific backdoors, which can be
easily injected through TaCT, the representations of individual
attack samples (trigger-carrying images) become almost indis-
tinguishable from those of normal images, rendering existing
detection techniques less effective. So to detect the backdoors,
we have to go beyond individual instances and look at the
distribution of the representations for the target class that a
data-contamination attack subtly alters. To this end, we present
in this section a new technique called Statistical Contamination
Analyzer (SCAn) to capture such an anomaly and further
demonstrate that the new approach is not only effective but
also robust to black-box attacks.
A. Design
Idea. A key observation is that in a backdoor contamination
attack, the adversary attempts to cheat a model into “merging”
two sets of images under the target label: those legitimately
belonging to the label and those with triggers but originally
from another label. This effort leads to a fundamental differ-
ence between the images in the target class and those in other
classes, in terms of their representation distributions, under the
following assumptions:
• Two-component decomposition. In the representation space,
each point can be decomposed into two independent compo-
nents: a class-specific identity and a variation component.
• Universal variation. The variation vectors in any uninfected
class have the same distribution as those in the attack sample
set (the collection of all attack images from a different class).
Prior research [38] shows that, in face recognition, an
image can be decomposed into three mutually orthogonal com-
ponents: within-class, between-class and noise, with the noise
part largely eliminated in a well-trained model. Intuitively,
one’s facial image contains her identity features that separate
her from others (that is, between-class component), as well
as the information describing her facial transformation, e.g.,
size, orientation, etc, (the within-class variation component).
Although the variation component does not contribute directly
to the classification task in a DNN model, it is often extracted
through the representation learning as it describes the recurrent
and robust signal in the input data, and the representation
learning by a non-ideal DNN model may not be able to
distinguish them from the identity component. We note that
the previous backdoor detection approaches fail to separate
these two components, allowing the variation part, which often
includes a trigger pattern, to reduce the sensitivity in detecting
more targeted attacks like TaCT.
We further assume that the variation component of an input
sample is independent of label (i.e., sample class); as a result,
the distribution learned from the input samples from one label
(e.g., an non-target class) can be transferred to another one
(e.g., the target class without infection). Intuitively, in face
recognition, smile is a variation component adopted by differ-
ent human individuals, leading to the common transformation
of face images independent of the identity of each individual
(i.e., the class label). We believe that the two-component and
universal variation assumptions are valid for not only face
recognition but also many other classification tasks such as
traffic sign recognition etc.
By decomposing samples in both normal and infected
classes, we are able to obtain a finer-grained observation
about the impacts of triggers on classification that cannot be
seen by simply clustering representations, as prior research
does. Fig 9 shows an example, where the representations of
samples in the infected class (right) can be viewed as a mixture
of two groups, the attack samples and the normal samples,
each decomposed into a distinct identity component and a
common variation component; in comparison, without the two-
component decomposition, the representations of the samples
in the infected and normal class are indistinguishable.
Formally, the representation of an input sample x can be
decomposed into two latent vectors:
r = R(x) = µt + ε (5)
where µt is the identity vector (component) of the class t that
x belongs to, and ε is the variation vector of x, which follows
a distribution independent of t. We denote by Xt the set of
the samples with the class label t, and by Rt the set of their
representations, i.e., Rt = {R(xi)|xi ∈ Xt}.
In the presence of a backdoor contamination attack, sam-
ples in a target class t∗ include two non-overlapping sub-
groups: i.e., normal samples and attack samples, i.e., Rt∗ =
Rnormalt∗ ∪Rtriggert∗ . As a result, the representations of samples
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Fig. 8: Sihouettte scores of AC defence on GTSRB dataset. 0 is the target label (infected class), 1 is the source label and all
the images in other classes are normal images. Box plot shows quartiles.
in the target class follow a multivariate mixture distribution:
for each xi ∈ Xt∗ ,
ri = δiµ1 + (1− δi)µ2 + ε, (6)
where µ1 and µ2 represent the identity vectors of normal and
attack samples in the class t∗, respectively, and δi = 1 if the xi
is a normal sample and δi = 0 otherwise. On the other hand,
the representations of samples in an uninfected, normal class
t form a homogeneous population: r = µt + ε. Therefore, the
task of backdoor detection can be formulated as a hypothesis
testing problem: given the representations of input data from
a specific class t, we want to test whether it is more likely
from a mixture group (as defined in (6)) or from a single
group (as defined in (5)). Notably, the problem is non-trivial
because the input vectors are of high dimension (hundreds
of features are learned in a typical DNN model), and more
importantly, the parameters (i. e., µt and ε) are unknown for
the mixture model and need to be derived simultaneously with
the hypothesis test. Finally, our approach does not rely on the
assumptions underlying current backdoor detection techniques
(section III): i.e., trigger-dominant representation significantly
different from that of a legitimate sample. Instead, we inves-
tigate the distributions of the representations from all input
samples labeled in each class: the class containing a mixture
of two groups of vectors is considered to be contaminated.
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Fig. 9: A schematic illustration of the assumption of two-
component decomposition (right) in the representation space,
in comparison with the naive homogeneous assumption (left).
Algorithm. Our approach utilizes several statistical methods to
estimate the most likely parameters for the decomposition and
untangling models and then detect an infected label through
a likelihood ratio test. It contains following steps and is
illustrated in Fig 10.
Step 1: Leverage the target model to generate representations
for all input data (images) from the training set that contains
both the infected and normal images.
Step 2: Estimate the parameters in the decomposition model
by running an EM (Eqn 5) algorithm on a set of clean data
for identifying the covariation matrix (Sε for the variation ε)
with a high confidence.
Step 3: Across all samples in each class, leverage the covaria-
tion matrix to estimate the identity vector and decompose the
representations of this class.
Step 4: Across all samples in each class, use an iterative
method to estimate the parameters for the mixture model
(Eqn 6) containing two subgroups.
Step 5: For samples in each class, perform the likelihood ratio
test on their representations using the mixture model (from
step 4) against the the null hypothesis – the decomposition
model (from step 3); if the null hypothesis is rejected, the
corresponding class is reported to be infected (i.e., this class
contain contaminated samples).
B. Technical Details
Here, we present the technical details of our Statistical
Contamination Analyzer (SCAn).
Two-component decomposition. Under the assumptions of
two-component decomposition and universal variation, a rep-
resentation vector can be described as the superposition of two
latent vectors: r = µ+ε, with µ and ε each following a normal
distribution: µ ∼ N(0, Sµ) and ε ∼ N(0, Sε), where Sµ and
Sε are two unknown covariance matrices, which need to be
estimated from the representations of input data. Notably, Sµ
can be approximated by the between-class covariance matrix
and Sε by the within-class covariance matrix. However, these
approximations are previously shown to be less effective than
the EM algorithm [7]. Therefore, we run the EM to estimate
most likely model parameters on a set of clean data (e.g., those
one uses to evaluate a machine learning model), as follows:
E-step: Following the decomposition model 5, we express the
relationship between the observation r = [r1; ...; rm] (e.g., for
m images) and the latent vectors h = [µ; ε1; ...; εm] in the
matrix form as:
r = Th, where T =

I I 0 · · · 0
I 0 I · · · 0
...
...
...
. . .
...
I 0 0 ... I
 (7)
9
Fig. 10: An illustration of Statistical Contamination Analyzer.
Thus, h ∼ N(0,Σh), where
Σh =

Sµ 0 0 · · · 0
0 Sε 0 · · · 0
0 0 Sε · · · 0
...
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 0 ... Sε
 (8)
and r ∼ N(0,Σr), where
Σr =

Sµ + Sε Sµ · · · Sµ
Sµ Sµ + Sε · · · Sµ
...
...
. . .
...
Sµ Sµ ... Sµ + Sε
 (9)
Hence, given the observation r and model parameters Sµ and
Sε, the expectation of h can be computed by [3]:
E(h|r) = ΣhTTΣ−1r r (10)
M-step: In this step, we try to obtain the most likely parameters
of Sµ and Sε that lead to the maximum expectation of h (i.e.,
µ and ε) in Eqn 10. A straightforward update rule of Sµ and
Sε is:
Sµ = cov(µ)
Sε = cov(ε)
(11)
where µ and ε are the expected vectors computed in the pre-
vious E-step. Even though we do not have a formal proof for
the convergence of the Expectation-Maximization algorithm,
the approach is found to be effective in our experiments.
Two-subgroup untangling. We assume the representations of
the infected samples follow a mixture model of two Gaussian
distributions, one for the group of cover samples (N(µ1, S1))
and the other for the group of attack samples (N(µ2, S2).
If the class labels are known for each sample, a hyperplane
that maximizes the between-class variation versus the within-
class variation among the projected representation vectors
can be determined by using a Linear Discriminant Analysis
(LDA) [22], which maximizes the Fisher’s Linear Discriminant
(FLD):
FLD(v) = vTΣBv/vTΣW v (12)
where
ΣB = (µ1 − µ2)(µ1 − µ2)T
ΣW = S1 + S2
Empirically, a greater FLD corresponds to distant projected
means and concentrated projected vectors for each of the
two subgroups. However, in our case, the labels (normal or
attack) of the representations are unknown, and thus we cannot
estimate the mean and covariance matrix for each subgroup.
To address this challenge, we first assume S1 = S2 = Sε
according to the universal variation assumption, and then use
an iterative algorithm to simultaneously estimate the model
parameters (µ1, µ2 and Sε) and the subgroup label for each
sample in the class.
Step-1: Suppose we know the class labels of samples in one
class, Then we can estimate the model parameters (µ1, µ2
and Sε) on the representations of normal samples and attack
samples, respectively, using the similar method as presented
above in the E-step.
Step-2: After obtaining the model parameters, we compute
the optimal discriminating hyperplane (denoted by its normal
vector v) by maximizing the FLD,
v = S−1ε (µ1 − µ2) (13)
from which we can re-compute the subgroup label ci for each
sample i (ci = 1 if the i-th sample is a cover sample, and
ci = 2 if it is an attack sample),
ci =
{
1, vT r < t
2, vT r ≥ t (14)
where
t = 12 (µ
T
1 S
−1
ε µ1 − µT2 S−1ε µ2)
Step 3: Iteratively execute Step-1 and Step-2 until convergence.
Finally, we will simultaneously obtain the model parameters
and the subgroup labels of all samples in the class of interest.
Hypothesis testing. For each class t, we aim to determine
whether a class is contaminated by using a likelihood ratio test
over the samples (Rt) in the class based on two hypotheses:
(null hypothesis) H0 : Rt is drawn from a single normal
distribution.
(alternative hypothesis) H1 : Rt is drawn from a mixture of
two normal distributions.
and the statistic is defined as:
Jt = −2 log P (Rt|H0)P (Rt|H1) (15)
where
P (Rt|H0) = Πr∈RtN(r|µt, Sε)
P (Rt|H1) = Πi:ci=1N(ri|µ1, Sε)Πi:ci=0N(ri|µ2, Sε)
Applying Eqn 15, we can simplify the likelihood ratio,
Jt = 2 log(P (Rt|H1)/P (Rt|H0))
=
∑
r∈Rt [(r − µt)TS−1ε (r − µt)− (r − µj)TS−1ε (r − µj)]
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where j ∈ {1, 2} is the subgroup label of the representation r.
According to the Wilks’ theorem [40], our statistic Jt
follows a χ2 distribution with the degree of freedom equal
to the different number of free parameters between the null
and alternative hypotheses. In our case, however, the degree
of freedom may be as large as tens of thousands, and thus it
is difficult to compute the p-value using the χ2 distribution.
Fortunately, according to the central limit theorem [39], a
regularized variable J¯t:
J¯t = (Jt − k)/
√
2k
follows the standard normal distribution, where k is the de-
gree of freedom of the underlying χ2 distribution. Therefore,
we leverage the normal distribution of the Median Absolute
Deviation (MAD) [17] to detect the class(es) with abnormally
great values of J . Specifically, we use J∗t as our test statistic
for the class t:
J∗t = |J¯t − J˜ |/(MAD(J¯) ∗ 1.4826)
where
J˜ = median({J¯t : t ∈ L})
MAD(J¯) = median({|J¯t − J˜ | : t ∈ L})
Here, the constant (1.4826) is a normalization constant for the
standard normal distribution followed by J¯t. Therefore, when
J∗t > 7.3891 = exp(2), the null hypothesis H0 can be rejected
with a confidence > (1−1e−9), and thus the class t is reported
to be contaminated.
C. Effectiveness
In this section, we report our study on the effectiveness of
SCAn, in which our approach was run against TaCT in the
presence of various tasks and triggers, and different amounts
of clean data.
(a) Square (b) Normal (c) Uniform (d) Watermark
Fig. 11: Four triggers used in our experiments
Various tasks and triggers. In our experiments, we ran TaCT
on three datasets (Table I) using four different triggers (Fig 11).
These datasets cover not only different tasks but also various
data distributions. Specifically, GTSRB has a small number
of classes and images; ILSVRC2012 contains many classes
with each involving a large number of images; MegaFace is
characterized by many classes but each has only a few images.
Our selection of triggers also took into consideration different
pixel distributions: the square trigger is a small norm pattern
with all pixels staying together; the normal trigger is more
spread out; the uniform trigger is scattered across an image,
and the watermark trigger is characterized by a dense and
observable pattern.
To the attacker’s advantage, we injected 2% attack images
and 1% cover images into the training set of the target
model. As shown in Table V and VI, all the resulting infected
models had a comparable performance with the uninfected one,
while misclassifying most images carrying the triggers. We
utilized the clean data comprising 10% of the whole dataset to
perform the decomposition and estimate the parameters of the
model (Eqn 5), and then ran the untangling algorithm on the
whole dataset using the variation matrices constructed from the
decomposition. Our study shows that SCAn is very effective in
detecting the TaCT attack. Particularly, the test statistic J∗ of
the target class was found to be well above from those of the
uninfected classes by orders of magnitude. Fig 12 illustrates
ln(J∗), showing that SCAn detected all infected models across
all datasets and triggers, without causing any false positive.
TABLE V: Top-1 accuracy of infected models (averaged over
5 rounds).
GTSRB ILSVRC2012 MegaFace
Square 96.6% 76.3% 71.1%
Normal 96.1% 76.1% 71.2%
Uniform 95.9% 75.9% 71.2%
Watermark 96.5% 75.5% 70.9%
Uninfected 96.4% 76.0% 71.4%
TABLE VI: Targeted misclassification rate of infected models
(averaged over 5 rounds).
GTSRB ILSVRC2012 MegaFace
Square 98.5% 98.2% 98.1%
Normal 82.4% 83.8% 81.4%
Uniform 94.9% 90.5% 88.2%
Watermark 99.3% 98.4% 97.1%
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Fig. 12: Detection results of SCAn on different datasets and
triggers (average over 5 rounds).
Clean data for decomposition. To achieve a high discrim-
inability on mixed representations, our untangling model needs
to accurately estimate the covariance matrix (Sε), which de-
scribes how sparse the representations of the same class are.
For this purpose, our approach uses a set of clean data to avoid
the noise that may affect the estimation. Our experiments show
that from a set of clean data comprising 10% of the whole
dataset, SCAn can accurately recover the covariance matrices.
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Furthermore, we investigated how much clean data is necessary
for the operation of SCAn.
Specifically, in the presence of 2% attack images and 1%
cover images, we adjusted the amount of the clean data for the
decomposition analysis. The results are shown in Fig 13. From
the figure, we can see that even when the clean data collected
for decomposition are merely 0.3% of the whole dataset, still
our approach generated the covariance matrices accurately
enough for differentiating the target class from others.
D. Robustness
Further we evaluated the robustness of SCAn in the pres-
ence of a black-box adversary who is knowledgeable about
our technique and attempts to evade our detection. More
specifically, we consider two attack strategies the adversary
could employ: use of multiple triggers for different target
classes to make the outlier test less effective, and recovery of
the decomposition parameters to find a less detectable trigger.
Following we report our analysis of our approach’s resilience
to these attacks.
Multiple target-trigger attack. The adversary might attempt
to infect a model using multiple triggers for different classes,
in the hope of elevating J∗ for many classes to undermine the
effectiveness of the outlier detection. This attempt, however,
could introduce observable drop on both the top-1 accuracy
and the targeted misclassification rate. In our research, we
analyzed the threat of such an attack using different number of
triggers targeting multiple labels. These triggers are all of the
same shape (square, see Fig 11a) but in different color patterns.
We first utilized 1% of the training set as the clean data for
decomposition. As demonstrated in Fig 14, SCAn starts to miss
some infected classes when 8 or more triggers are injected
into the training set, which could be addressed by raising
the amount of the clean data for decomposition when the
number of injected triggers is less than the half of total classes.
Fig 15 demonstrates how many clean data are needed to defeat
multiple target-trigger attacks on GTSRB. Specifically, a set
of clean data comprising 18% of the whole dataset can defeat
attacks injecting multiple triggers for 21 (48.8%) classes. Most
importantly, when the number of injected triggers is more
than half of total classes, as demonstrated on Fig 16, there
is an observable negative impact on the performance of the
model for ILSVRC2012: its top-1 accuracy goes down from
76.3% to 71.1%, which leads us to believe that this evasion
attempt might leads to the exposure of the backdoor infection
of the target model, and the targeted misclassification rate
drops significantly, a.k.a, the trigger becomes less effective.
Decomposition parameter recovery. Such information in-
cluding the whole dataset, the target model’s structure and our
detection method, once exposed, could allow the adversary
to search for the trigger with the minimum impact on the
representation distribution. However, we argue that the cost
to identify such a trigger is non-trivial. Given the default
confidence threshold (i.e., p-value= 1e−9), the power (the false
negative rate) of test statistic J∗ is < 10−4, indicating that an
adversary needs to examine on average 104 triggers to identify
a putative trigger that bypasses the SCAn defense. This will
lead to a significantly amount of computation (104 times than
the defense) because it requires the adversary to reproduce
the whole defense procedure including training a substitute
model for the examination of each trigger. Besides, an effective
trigger may not be identified easily, as the relationship between
the trigger and the test statistic J∗ is complex and obscure,
which unlike the gradients when training a neural networks can
be directly used to guide the trigger searching. We note that
an adversary may use a more sophisticated strategy to search
for an effective trigger that bypasses the SCAn defense; we
plan to explore such strategies and their mitigation techniques
in our future research.
Giving the adversary further advantage, we assume that
the adversary can somehow leverage the parameters of the
representation distributions of the target class (e.g., the identity
vectors and the covariance matrix Sε) to largely accelerate
the trigger searching. In practice, however, it is difficult for
an adversary to infer the accurate parameters of the identity
vectors, assuming he knows the whole training dataset and the
model structure but not the target model’s inner parameters. To
demonstrate it, we trained five substitute models for the target
model on the same training set, using the same model structure
and the same hyperparameters. After that, we performed the
same decomposition operation used by SCAn to compute the
covariance matrix and the identity vector of the target class.
The first row of Table VII shows the average distance between
the estimated and the real identity vector (estimation error). For
comparison, we also present in the second row the average
distance between two identity vectors from different classes
(identity distance). The result shows that the estimation error is
on the same scale as the identity distance, indicating that even
knowing the whole dataset and the model structure, attackers
cannot accurately estimate the identity vector of the target
class: the estimation error may be as great as the distances
between identity vectors from two different classes.
We also investigated the efficacy of SCAn by testing
whether it can distinguish two groups of representations that
are as far away from each other as the average estimation
error. Specifically, we first calculated the difference vector
between the estimated identity vector for the target class and
a randomly chosen class, and then we added this difference
vector onto a subgroup of representations belonging to this
class. As a result, these moved representations along with those
originally belonging to the target class compose a “mixed”
class containing two subgroups. We then ran SCAn to check
whether this “mixed” class is infected. The third row illustrates
the average test statistics J∗ in their logarithm scale for the
“mixed” classes, which are sufficiently high, indicating that
even under this setting, he can only infer the identity vector
with such a large error that the infected class can still be
detected by SCAn.
TABLE VII: SCAn results when attackers know the whole
dataset and model structure.
GTSRB ILCVR2012 MegaFace
Estimation error 15.6 5.3 12.9
Identity distance 26.7 9.6 19.4
Ln(J∗) 8.2 10.2 7.1
V. DISCUSSION
Limitations. To perform SCAn, defenders need to obtain a set
of clean data. We argue that this is a reasonable requirement,
as this set can be as small as 3% of the whole training set
for defending against multiple triggers attack. Our method
12
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
% data are known and clean
0
1
2
3
4
5
Ln
(J*
)
Target
Threshold
Fig. 13: Test statistic J∗ of the target class
on different amount of clean data known
for decomposition model (average over 5
rounds).
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
# of triggers
0
1
2
3
4
5
Ln
(J*
)
Target
Threshold
Fig. 14: Minimum J∗ of target classes
under multiple target-trigger attack and 1%
clean data known for decomposition model
(average over 5 rounds).
1(2.3%) 5(11.6%) 10(23.2%) 15(34.9%) 21(48.8%)
# of triggers
0
5
10
15
20
%
 o
f c
le
an
 d
at
a
Fig. 15: The amount of clean data re-
quired by decomposition model for de-
feating multiple target-trigger attacks on
GTSRB.
also needs to witness attack images carrying the trigger and
labelled by the target label. If these samples were not given,
in principle, our method cannot detect the infected class.
However, this issue can be addressed by modifying our current
method to an online detector. Specifically, we may first build
our decomposition model offline, and try to untangle a class
once an image claimed to belong to this class arrives. Our pri-
mary experiments showed that after witnessing about 50 attack
images, SCAn can detect the infected class. Nevertheless, we
leave detailed evaluation to future work.
Future research. We will develop more efficient methods to
untangle mixed representations, e.g., by using deep learning
models built upon GPU acceleration. In addition, we plan to
adapt our method to non-vision learning tasks, for which the
main challenge is to build a task-specific approach to untan-
gling representations of discrete inputs that may not follow
high dimensional Gaussian distributions in the representation
space. An interesting case to be investigated further arises from
our experiments on MegaFace, where the results showed that
the classes containing both babies and adults will produce
abnormal relatively high J∗ than other normal classes, even
though this anomaly can be ignored compared with those
infected classes. This appears to suggest that our method can
be a potential method to mine hard-negative examples, and
may be used to evaluate the quality of classification results for
a DNN model.
VI. RELATED WORKS
Our method SCAn is a kind of statistic defense against
data contamination attacks. It is powered by leveraging the
distribution of sample representations (Sε of decomposition
model) to differentiate the outlier class from other benign
classes. The most recent relevant works were discussed in
Section III-B that are all defeated by TaCT, whereas SCAn
is effective to detect TaCT. Next, we introduce other defense
strategies in this field.
Two general defences against data contamination attacks
were proposed by Nelson et al. [25] and Baracaldo et al. [5].
Both methods require extensive retraining of the model on the
datasets with the similar size as the original one, which is often
infeasible for DNNs. Additionally, they detect infected data by
evaluating the overall performance of the model. However, the
overall performance of the infected model often remains good
under current advanced attacks (like TaCT), and thus these
defenses will become ineffective against these attacks .
In the traditional statistical analysis domain, a review
written by Victoria et al. [13] summarizes several effective
outlier detection methods, including k-nearest neighbors (k-
nn) [14], k-means [23] and principal components analysis
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tional statistical methods
directly applied on repre-
sentations produced by a
TaCT-infected model.
(pca) [15]. To investigate whether directly applying them to
sample representations can detect infected classes, we applied
them on representations produced by a TaCT infected model
for those images belonging to the target class. The results
are demonstrated on Fig 17. We observe that these meth-
ods produce many false positives. Another method proposed
by Steinhardt et al. [31] tried to detect infected classes by
searching input samples with large spatial angles from the
class center. However, this method does not work for carefully
designed trigger or images with complex background, because
in these cases, the trigger may be similar as the background,
and thus the angle of those images with triggers will be indis-
tinguishable from those of normal samples. More importantly,
as claimed by the authors, this method failed to detect the
infected class containing 30% or more attack data. In contrast,
our method SCAn is robust enough to handle these cases as
we demonstrated in Section IV.
Liu et al. [19] proposed a neuron-driven method. They first
prune neurons that are dormant when processing clean data
until the accuracy tested on a hold-on dataset being below a
threshold, and then fine-tune the pruned model to recover the
accuracy. Their defense relies on extensive interaction with the
training process. In contrast, our approach sanitizes the dataset
in one round and is independent from the training of the target
model.
VII. CONCLUSION
Our work demonstrated that backdoors created by existing
black-box attacks are source-agnostic and characterized by
unique representations generated for attack images, which are
mostly determined by the trigger, regardless of other image
content, and clearly distinguishable from those for normal
images. Existing detection techniques rely on these two propri-
eties and all fail to raise the bar to black-box attacks injecting
source-specific backdoors like TaCT. Based on leveraging
the distribution of the sample representations through a two-
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component decomposition model, we designed a statistical
method SCAn to untangle representations of each class into a
mixture model, and utilized a likelihood ratio test to detect an
infected class. The effectiveness and robustness of SCAn were
demonstrated through extensive experiments. Our study takes
a step forward to understand the mechanism of implanting a
backdoor within a DNN model and how a backdoor looks like
from the perspective of model’s representations. It may lead
to deeper understanding of neural networks.
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APPENDIX A
CALCULATION OF GLOBAL MODEL
The way we use is the same with [7]. For completeness,
we write it here in our style. In our global model, the most
computation source will be used to calculate the Eqn 5.
E(h|r) = ΣhTTΣ−1r r
where efficient calculation of Σ−1r is challenge. For a class
containing m images, the computational complexity of a naive
way to calculate Eqn 5 is O(d3m3) where d is the dimension
of r. However, by taking the advantage of the structure of Σr,
its complexity can be reduced to O(d3 + md2). Concretely,
Σ−1r is in the form:
Σ−1r =

F +G G · · · G
G F +G · · · G
...
...
. . .
...
G G ... F +G
 (16)
where
F = S−1ε
G = −(mSµ + Sε)−1SµS−1ε (17)
Thus, we have
µ =
∑m
i=1 Sµ(F +mG)ri
εj = S
′
εrj +
∑m
i=1 SεGri
= rj − µ
(18)
where S′ε is the result of last M-step in our EM-like algorithm.
TABLE VIII: Model Architecture for GTSRB.
Layer Type # of Channels Filter Size Stride Activation
Conv 32 3 x 3 1 ReLU
Conv 32 3 x 3 1 ReLU
MaxPool 32 2 x 2 2 -
Conv 64 3 x 3 1 ReLU
Conv 64 3 x 3 1 ReLU
MaxPool 64 2 x 2 2 -
Conv 128 3 x 3 1 ReLU
Conv 128 3 x 3 1 ReLU
MaxPool 128 2 x 2 2 -
FC 256 - - ReLU
FC 43 - - Softmax
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